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THE COST OF PRIVACY:
RILEY V. CALIFORNIA’S IMPACT ON CELL
PHONE SEARCHES
Jennifer L. Moore, Jonathan Langton, and Joseph Pochron
DeSales University
2755 Station Avenue, Center Valley, Pennsylvania 18034
jennifer.moore@desales.edu

ABSTRACT
Riley v. California is the United States Supreme Court’s first attempt to regulate the searches
of cell phones by law enforcement. The 2014 unanimous decision requires a warrant for all cell
phone searches incident to arrest absent an emergency. This work summarizes the legal
precedent and analyzes the limitations and practical implications of the ruling. General
guidelines for members of the criminal justice system at all levels consistent with the Supreme
Court’s decision are provided.
Keywords: search incident to arrest, cell phone searches, U.S. Supreme Court

1.

INTRODUCTION

The
law
notoriously
lags
behind
advancements in technology.
The initial
explosion of cybercrimes in the 21st century
left the American criminal justice system
woefully unprepared. The courts struggled to
confront the emerging crimes of computer
hacking, Internet viruses and sexting with
traditional criminal statutes. Forced to work
within the confines of criminal laws already
on the books, trespass, theft and child
pornography statutes were stretched to new
limits (Birkhold, 2013). While the federal and
state governments eventually updated their
laws, the technology gap remains.1 The slow
response time of state and federal legislatures
perpetuates a legal system constantly trying
1

See The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18
U.S.C. § 1030 (2008); Pennsylvania enacted its
sexting statute on October 25, 2012 in 18 PA.C.S.
§ 6312 (2014).
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to “catch up” with innovation. In addition, a
two hundred year old constitution is also
asked to confront modern technological issues
that the founding fathers never imagined.
The long delay in the appellate process
further exasperates the technological gap, as
the Supreme Court just addressed the now
outdated use of pagers in 2010 (City of
Ontario v. Quon, 2010).
The search and seizure clause of the
Fourth Amendment was recently evaluated in
relation to cell phone privacy. Nearly 41
years after the development of the first mobile
phone (“The first mobile”, 2013), the Supreme
Court in Riley v. California issued its first
major privacy ruling regarding the devices. In
a
unanimous
decision,
the
justices
emphatically ruled that the search of a
suspect’s cell phone incident to arrest requires
a warrant. Conceding that Riley will now
make the job of law enforcement more
difficult, the Court emphasized the unique
attributes of cell phones and the cost of
maintaining personal privacy (Riley v.
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California, 2014). Local, state and federal law
enforcement agencies must now confront the
real-world impact of Riley in criminal
investigations. This article will examine the
legal aspects of the Supreme Court’s opinion
in Riley and highlight the limitations of the
ruling. In addition, the practical effect of the
decision on various parties in the criminal
justice system will be evaluated in detail.
Finally, a blueprint of acceptable digital
forensic techniques after Riley will be
explained.

2.

THE SUPREME

COURT’S UNANIMOUS
VERDICT
The Supreme Court consolidated the cases of
David Leon Riley and Brima Wurie in a
groundbreaking case regarding the evolution
of privacy in the digital age. In separate
incidents, both men had their cell phones
searched incident to arrest without a warrant.
The information contained on their cell
phones ultimately led to convictions for
additional offenses.
Riley was initially
stopped in California for a traffic violation
but eventually arrested after an inventory
search revealed two loaded handguns under
the hood of his car.
During the search
incident to arrest, Riley’s cell phone was
removed from the pocket of his pants and
searched preliminarily by the police officer on
scene.
A review of texts messages and
contacts indicated membership in the Bloods
street gang. Two hours after the arrest, a
detective further analyzed Riley’s cell phone
without a warrant at the police station. The
detective discovered photographs of Riley
standing near a car allegedly used in a drive
by shooting. Riley was ultimately convicted
for attempted murder, assault with a
semiautomatic firearm, and firing at an
occupied vehicle and sentenced to 15 years to
life in prison for his involvement in the drive
by shooting (Riley v. California, 2014, p.
2481).
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Brima
Wurie
was
arrested
after
purchasing drugs and two cell phones were
seized from his person incident to arrest. At
the police station, Burie’s phone continued to
receive calls from a contact noted as “my
house.” An officer opened the flip phone and
accessed the call log to retrieve the incoming
telephone number. A trace of the number
was completed to obtain a physical address.
After securing a search warrant, the police
searched Burie’s home and seized weapons,
cash and large amounts of crack cocaine.
Burie’s convictions resulted in a sentence of
262 months in federal prison (Riley v.
California, 2014, p. 2482). On appeal, both
cases raised the question of whether a warrant
is needed to search a cell phone incident to
arrest.
Chief Justice Robert’s opinion addressed
the question presented within the framework
provided by the leading search incident to
arrest case, Chimel v. California. In 1969,
Chimel declared that police officers could
perform a warrantless search of a suspect and
the area within the suspect’s immediate
control incident to an arrest. This exception
to the warrant requirement was justified by
the potential threat to officer safety and the
possibility for the destruction of valuable
evidence (Chimel v. California, 1969). The
Chimel doctrine was extended to include a
quick
search
of
personal
property
“immediately associated with the person of the
arrestee” (U.S. v. Chadwick, 1977, p. 15). In
searching for relevant precedent applicable to
the factual scenarios before the Court, Chief
Justice Roberts focused on the 1973 decision
of United States v. Robinson. The holding in
Robinson permitted police officers to search a
crumpled cigarette packet located in a
suspect’s coat pocket incident to arrest. A
review of the contents of the cigarette packet
revealed illegal drugs. The Supreme Court in
Riley had to determine if a cell phone was
analogous to that crumpled cigarette package
or an entirely different category of property.
Similar to most Fourth Amendment cases, the
answer hinged on the balancing of government
interests and individual privacy.
© 2014 ADFSL
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The
unanimous
decision
spent
a
significant amount of time examining the
unique characteristics of a cell phone. When
compared to other physical objects, the Court
emphasized the vast quantitative and
qualitative differences of the modern phone.
The immense storage capacity and variety of
data contained on cell phones was
emphasized, which Chief Justice Roberts
noted could just “as easily be called cameras,
video players, rolodexes, calendars, tape
recorders,
libraries,
diaries,
albums,
televisions, maps or newspapers” (Riley v.
California, 2014, p. 2489). Accordingly, a
warrantless search of a cell phone implicates a
substantially greater violation of privacy than
reviewing the contents of a wallet or cigarette
packet. The Court noted that 90 percent of
adults in America essentially have “on their
person a digital record of nearly every aspect
of their lives–from the mundane to the
intimate” (Riley v. California, p. 2490). A
detailed examination of a cell phone is
analogous to an exhaustive search of an entire
Accordingly, cell phones were
home.2
distinguished from other types of personal
property and the precedent from Robinson
was inapplicable.
The decision also reviewed each of the
Chimel rationale as they applied to cell
phones–officer safety and the imminent
destruction of evidence. The Supreme Court
quickly dismissed the concern for officer
safety, noting that “[d]igital data stored on a
cell phone cannot itself be used as a weapon
to harm an arresting officer or to effectuate
the arrestee’s escape” (Riley v. California,
2014, p. 2485). While police officers remain
free to examine the physical aspects of a cell
phone for concealed risks, such as razor
blades, the content of the phone remains
protected. The Court also clarified that the
2

Chief Justice Roberts explained that, “a cell
phone search would typically expose to the
government to far more than the most exhaustive
search of a house” (Riley v. California, 2014, p.
2491).
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potential for “indirect” threats from third
parties does not justify an automatic
warrantless search of cell phone data incident
to arrest.
While data on a phone can
potentially reveal to law enforcement that
additional accomplices are en route to the
scene, they are not covered by the rationale of
Chimel and its progeny. Chimel applies only
to threats from the arrestee, not third parties.
In factually specific situations where a unique
safety threat exists, the exigent circumstances
exception
remains
available
for
law
enforcement (Riley v. California, p. 2487).
In regards to the destruction of evidence
rationale from Chimel, the Court focused on
the potential for remote wiping or encryption
of digital data. The federal government and
the State of California argued that imminent
threats to cell phone contents justified a
warrantless search incident to arrest
exception.
Specifically, the contents of a
phone can be completely erased if it remains
connected to a wireless network and a third
party sends the appropriate signal.
In
addition, after a phone locks the information
stored can be encrypted with a special
program to completely prevent access without
the applicable encryption key. The Supreme
Court quickly dismissed both ideas as
justification for an automatic warrantless
search, noting that little evidence was
provided that these problems even exist in the
field. The Court also reiterated that Chimel
applies only to direct threats from the
arrestee, and not to third parties wiping
content or the normal functions of an
encryption security feature. Police officers
remain free to employ alternative methods to
protect digital data at the scene of an arrest
short of a search, such as removing the
battery, turning the phone off or disabling an
automatic-lock feature (Riley v. California,
2014).
The unanimous Court concluded by
acknowledging the impact of their decision,
noting “[w]e cannot deny that our decision
today will have an impact on the ability of
law enforcement to combat crime” (Riley v.
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California, 2014, p. 2493). The decision in
Riley, however, does not completely isolate a
cell phone from a comprehensive search. It
simply requires a warrant or an independent
exception to the warrant requirement to
justify the excessive privacy intrusion.

2.1

Justice Samuel Alito’s
Concurrence

While the Supreme Court was unanimous in
requiring a warrant for cell phone searches
incident to arrest, Justice Alito issued a
concurrence to explain his legal reasoning.
Specifically, the concurrence addressed the
underlying Chimel rationale cited by the
Court for conducting a search incident to
arrest – officer safety and preventing the
destruction of evidence. Alito argues that the
practice of searching a suspect after an arrest
has a strong historical foundation independent
of the Chimel factors.
Citing numerous
historical examples of searches incident to
arrest as routine practice for police officers,
Alito concludes that “the rule is not closely
linked to the need for officer safety and
evidence preservation” (Riley v. California,
2014, p. 2496).
In addition, Alito cites
numerous court decisions that permitted
officers to read written items found on
suspects incident to arrest as evidence that
safety and evidence destruction are not the
only controlling factors.
The concurrence
clarifies that Chimel involved searching the
scene of an arrest, not the search of a person.
Accordingly, Alito would not “allow that
reasoning to affect cases like these that
concern the search of the person of the
arrestees” (Riley v. California, p. 2496).
Alito also emphasizes the limits of the
Riley decision and the need for state and
federal legislatures to pass laws regarding
digital evidence. Citing the passage of the
Omnibus Crime Control Act after Katz v.
United States restricted the warrantless
monitoring of public pay phones, the
concurrence emphasized the “better position”
of legislatures to address changing technology.
As written, Alito concedes that Riley gives
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greater protection to digital evidence than
physical evidence. An address on a slip of
paper is searchable incident to arrest, but an
address contained in a cell phone’s contacts
list is not. Additionally, photographs in a
wallet can be viewed by police officers, while
those on a phone are protected.
Alito
concludes “it would be very unfortunate if
privacy protection is the 21st century were left
primarily to the federal courts using the blunt
instrument of the Fourth Amendment” (Riley
v. California, 2014, p. 2497).

3.

LIMITATIONS ON THE
RULING

A single Supreme Court decision is never the
“last word” on a specific legal issue. The
opinion will inevitably be dissected by the
lower courts, distinguished by different factual
circumstances and interpreted differently.
The Riley decision provides several notable
limitations that can potentially impact police
officers’ enforcement of the ruling.
For
example, the Roberts Court traditionally
issues very limited decisions that apply
specifically to the factual situations presented.
Riley is no exception. Both consolidated cases
resolved in Riley involved searches of cell
phones incident to arrest. Consequently, the
Court’s ruling appears to apply only in
situations where the suspect is arrested. This
leaves open the possibility for warrantless cell
phone searches in other circumstances
independent of arrest. For example, police
may encounter a cell phone while performing
a warrantless search under the automobile
exception.
Although the Supreme Court
distinguished cell phones from other physical
property, it did not completely eliminate the
possibility that a brief content search might
be appropriate in the automobile context due
to the mobility of vehicles. In addition, the
plain view exception could also arise and
justify a cell phone search. If a police officer
is lawfully in an apartment and sees a text
message implicating criminal activity flash on
the screen, they could be justified in searching
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the phone. As long as the scenario does not
involve a search incident to arrest, Riley is
not completely controlling.
The opinion itself contains a limiting
instruction to remind the audience that Riley
is limited solely to search incident to arrest
cases. In footnote 1, the Court notes that
since both parties “agree that these cases
involve searches incident to arrest, these cases
do not implicate the question whether the
collection or inspection of aggregated digital
information amounts to a search under other
circumstances” (Riley v. California, 2014, p.
2489). Therefore, the collection of digital
information by law enforcement using other
means beyond cell phone examination incident
to arrest remains an open legal issue.
Riley also fails to provide adequate
guidance for limiting the scope of search
warrants on cell phones. Mobile devices are
currently searched and examined by
practitioners with nuanced tools that contain
forms of automated data extraction and
parsing. While Riley calls for the acquisition
of a search warrant, the Supreme Court did
not specify which techniques could be used on
mobile device. This issue has already surfaced
in the lower courts. The U.S. District Court
for the Central District of Illinois recently
ruled in U.S. v. Schlingloff (2012) that a
computer forensic practitioner may not utilize
automated data filters to locate evidence that
is extraneous to the basis of the probable
cause articulated in the search warrant. In
Schlingloff, a computer forensic practitioner
utilized an automated filter within a forensic
tool to search for files containing child
pornography, resulting in the location of child
pornography on the suspect’s computer. The
warrant was explicitly based on probable
cause pertaining to an identity theft
investigation, and although the child
pornography filter utilized to search the
computer is commonly set as a default
methodology within the forensic tool, the
practitioner did have the ability to conduct an
examination of the device without using the
filter. Because the practitioner did not choose
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to deactivate the child pornography filter, the
District Court ruled that the utilization of the
filter reached beyond the scope of the search,
resulting in the suppression of the digital
evidence. Although methodologies certainly
differ between mobile device forensics and
computer forensics, Chief Justice Roberts’
opinion in Riley draws clear analogies between
modern cell phone technology and the
capabilities that are typically associated with
computers. Because of this commonality,
Schlingloff may represent a glimpse into the
future of legal issues concerning the
examination of cell phones and the associated
requirements for warrants and methodologies.
Although Riley largely neglected to delve
into the intricacies of the scope of search
warrants for digital devices, the Court
acknowledged the complexities associated with
the data capabilities of mobile devices. Just
as Apple mobile devices support data storage
through the iCloud service, modern cell
phones consistently use data remotely stored
on third-party servers. The Court explicitly
referenced modern cell phones’ utilization of
cloud computing, noting that “a cell phone is
used to access data located elsewhere, at the
tap of the screen” (Riley v. California, 2014,
p. 2491).
Although the majority opinion
appears to recognize a necessity for Fourth
Amendment protection of data stored through
cloud-based technology, the Court hesitates to
clearly delineate the important distinction
between locally and remotely stored data.
More importantly, Riley also fails to recognize
the significance of such a distinction, stating
that “cell phone users often may not know
whether particular information is stored on
the device or in the cloud, and it generally
makes little difference” (Riley v. California, p.
2491). While modern cell phone capabilities
allow for the storage of data in a multitude of
locations on the individual device and through
cloud-based services, Riley fails to establish a
framework for the legal and forensic
interpretation of these differences.
The
Court’s opinion suggests that this distinction
is irrelevant for the purpose of searching a
device incident to arrest, and effectively paves
Page 11
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the way for further discussion and debate
regarding the scope of warrants for the search
of digital evidence.
Arguably, the Riley decision can also be
read as applying only to cell phones as
opposed to all types of electronic devices.
While the type of information stored on a cell
phone is analogous to that found on iPads or
iPods, the justices did not directly make the
comparison.
As additional technological
devices continue to emerge, such as Google
glasses or the highly anticipated iWatch,
courts will be forced to determine if they are
similar enough to cell phones to apply Riley.
An armband used by athletes to map their
latest run or bike ride could provide
indispensable GPS data. Since these devices
lack the photographs, contacts, calendars and
other personal information found on cell
phones, they are potentially distinguishable
from the Riley decision based on the level of
privacy
intrusion.
The
ultimate
determination of what types of devices fall
under Riley’s control will fall on the lower
courts.
The Supreme Court also expressly noted
that the exigency exception to the warrant
requirement is still applicable in appropriate
factual circumstances to justify a search of
cell phone data. Similar to other areas of
Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence, the
warrant requirement is eliminated in
situations where the safety of the police or
public is in immediate danger or evidence is
imminently being destroyed.
The Riley
opinion provides two factual examples in
which a cell phone search may be justified due
to exigent circumstances.
First, law
enforcement would be entitled to search the
contents of a phone if the suspect is
apparently texting an accomplice to detonate
an explosive device. Second, the Court would
seemingly allow the warrantless search of a
phone believed to contain the location of a
kidnapped child (Riley v. California, 2014, p.
2494). These examples simply highlight the
potential for countless unique factual
scenarios that justify cell phone searches
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incident to arrest. As the lower courts begin
to interpret and apply Riley, this exception
possesses the greatest potential for expansion
and abuse. At this time, however, the justices
explicitly held that threats of remote wiping
and/or data encryption do not constitute
exigent circumstance.

4.

PRACTICAL IMPACT
OF RILEY ON LAW
ENFORCEMENT

Riley appears to unequivocally require a
warrant for any cell phone seized during an
arrest that lacks exigent circumstances. In
order to ascertain the practical impact of
Riley on the law enforcement community, a
few points must be clarified. First, the term
“search” used in relation to a cell phone can
actually describe a multitude of approaches
utilized by law enforcement personnel with
varying levels of digital forensics knowledge.
In some jurisdictions, cell phone searches are
limited to a simple scroll analysis (Ayers,
Brothers, and Jansen, 2013, p. 16). A scroll
analysis of a mobile device involves the
manual manipulation of a cell phone, through
which a law enforcement officer will “scroll”
through a phone while photographing or
similarly documenting the phone’s screen as it
displays the relevant information. Scroll
analyses, although recognized as an accepted
practice in the digital forensics community,
represent a cursory and rudimentary form of
mobile device forensic analysis, requiring
negligible training or experience on the part of
the individual examining the device (Ayers, et
al., p. 18).
Other jurisdictions utilize more advanced
digital forensic tools designed specifically for
the acquisition, extraction, decoding, and
reporting of data residing within a mobile
device (Ayers, Brothers, and Jansen, 2013, p.
17).
These innovative tools require
specialized training and certification, as well
as acceptable forensic laboratories for proper
utilization. The environmental requirement
© 2014 ADFSL
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remains a focal point of concern for law
enforcement personnel.
Digital forensics
laboratories
formerly
focused
almost
exclusively on traditional computer analysis.
These laboratories adapted in response to the
exponential growth in the prevalence of
mobile device use and the evolution of the
technological capabilities of these mobile
devices. As the prevalence and capabilities of
cell phones have grown and developed, the
law enforcement community has reacted by
training personnel on mobile forensic tools
and methodologies, as well as utilizing or
establishing laboratory environments for the
analysis of the devices (Malone, 2011).
Due to the differences in jurisdictional
capabilities and practices, the practical
implications of Riley on the law enforcement
community are diverse and versatile. The
opinion doesn’t simply impose restrictions or
regulations on a singular “police” presence, but
on a number of law enforcement personnel
working in different capacities. For the sake of
brevity, the law enforcement personnel
impacted by the Riley decision can be
categorized into the following four groups:
first responders, criminal investigators,
prosecutors and forensic practitioners.
First responders and criminal investigators
are the categorical groups of law enforcement
personnel that will arguably be the most
heavily impacted by Riley. As seen through
the facts of both consolidated cases under the
umbrella of Riley, police officers who are in
the process of arresting an individual and
conducting administrative or investigative
searches of the arrestee’s person or immediate
surroundings will commonly locate a cell
phone. The language of the Riley opinion very
clearly establishes the necessity to procure a
search warrant after the seizure of a cell
phone incident to arrest. While Chief Justice
Roberts identified exigency exceptions in the
unanimous opinion, his emphasis on the
acquisition of a search warrant before
conducting an investigative search of a cell
phone’s contents has a sizeable impact on the
actions of first responders and criminal
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Previously, a police officer may have
conducted a cursory scroll analysis of the
phone in order to verify written or verbal
statements made by the arrested party, to
expedite traditional investigatory tactics, or
to document information before a device or its
contents can be remotely wiped, protected by
password, or otherwise modified (Murphy,
2009, p. 2). Exigency exceptions aside, Riley
very clearly disallows some of the
aforementioned tactics that have been utilized
by first responders and criminal investigators
in order to expediently search the content of a
cell phone. Rather than reacting intuitively or
reflexively as investigators seeking actionable
information, law enforcement personnel
conducting searches incident to arrest must
accept the challenge presented by Riley of
protecting and preserving digital evidence.
Additionally, prosecutors will be impacted
by the Riley opinion.
While many
prosecutors are currently procuring search
warrants for digital evidence, they will
undoubtedly be pressured to achieve a higher
degree of awareness regarding mobile devices
that require authority for search or forensic
examination. The Department of Justice
currently serves as an example of the reaction
to Riley on the part of prosecutors, as it has
publicly announced that it will strive to
operate within the bounds of the unanimous
opinion while seeking to clarify and utilize
exigency
exceptions
(Myers,
2014).
Prosecutors will need to provide guidance in
order to ensure that first responders and
criminal investigators are dealing with digital
evidence from cell phones in a manner that is
consistent with the Riley decision. More
importantly, Riley represents the Supreme
Court’s first foray into the realm of mobile
device forensics. As the rampant utilization
of cell phones continues to permeate the lives
of American citizens, the Court will inevitably
need to make similarly impactful decisions in
the
future
regarding
warrant
scope
considerations and plain view technicalities as
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they relate to the forensic analyses of cell
phones. As these legal discussions evolve,
prosecutors will face the unenviable task of
representing the Government’s interests,
educating first responders, and learning the
methodological nuances of mobile device
forensics from competent practitioners.
Although the on-site methods utilized by
first responders to expediently search the
contents of a cell phone appear to have been
largely invalidated by Riley, Chief Justice
Robert’s language seems less indicative of a
dramatic change in policy for the part of the
fourth categorical group of law enforcement
personnel, the certified forensic practitioners.
The vast majority of mobile device forensic
practitioners currently require legal authority
to examine a cell phone through a search
warrant or written consent due to industry
standards and individual agency operating
procedures (U.S. Department of Justice, 2004,
p. 7). While the language of Riley does little
to hamper the current practices of mobile
device forensic examiners, it may have a
counterintuitive and decidedly positive impact
on the discipline of mobile device forensics as
whole. Rather than placing an emphasis on
the ambiguously dangerous “cost” that privacy
in the digital age may have, the Riley decision
clearly communicates the nuances and
protocols associated with mobile device
forensics for the law enforcement community.
In order to do so, Chief Justice Roberts
relied on the National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) Guidelines on Mobile
Device Forensics (Riley v. California, 2014, p.
2486).
Roberts used these guidelines to
emphasize and respond to the government’s
arguments about remote data wiping,
encryption, and similar concerns about the
volatility of data residing on mobile devices.
By
utilizing
industry
standards
and
appropriate literature, the Supreme Court
outlined a blueprint for acceptable law
enforcement techniques utilized to secure and
examine a cell phone.
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5.

THE BLUEPRINT:

ACCEPTABLE TECHNIQUES
FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT
AFTER RILEY
First, the physical aspects of a phone may be
inspected to determine if it could be used as a
weapon. Although fairly straightforward and
simplistic, the Supreme Court’s allowance of a
physical inspection of a cell phone serves to
protect the law enforcement official, typically
a responding officer or investigator, from
immediate and obvious danger. Although
Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion clearly
demonstrates the Court’s prioritization of
personal privacy over the government’s
concerns about the protection of digital
evidence, the opinion also relays several
acceptable practices for law enforcement to
protect volatile digital evidence on mobile
devices. Aside from a physical inspection of
the device, the second allowable practice
suggests that police officers concerned with
the threat of remote wiping can remove a
phone’s battery or turn the phone off (Riley v.
California, 2014, p. 2487).
Although the
removal of a cell phone’s power source will
ultimately prevent a phone from being
remotely wiped through a command using
wireless connectivity or cellular network
services, the practice can create different
problems for mobile device practitioners.
Removing a cell phone’s battery or effectively
turning the phone off may activate
authentication
codes
such
as
PIN’s,
passwords, or complex security codes unique
to the device. While following this practice
will maintain the integrity of the digital
evidence, it may also compromise access to
the device, effectively delaying or invalidating
the search of the cell phone.
Additionally, law enforcement personnel
can leave a seized cell phone turned on and
place the phone in a Faraday bag to block
radio waves (Riley v. California, 2014, p.
© 2014 ADFSL
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2487). Faraday bags are capable of blocking
radio frequency (“RF”) waves from reaching
the mobile device and denying wireless
connectivity, preventing the remote wipe or
encryption of a cell phone’s data. Although
largely effective, the utilization of Faraday
bags entails a certain level of risk. Faraday
containers are not without limitations, as they
do allow for the minute possibility that a
contained cell phone could connect to a cell
tower in the immediate area. Additionally,
Faraday bags and similar vessels can be
unsuccessfully sealed by a first responder,
while cables connecting a contained phone to
a forensic workstation may act as antennas,
ultimately allowing access to cellular
networks. Unfortunately, even the successful
utilization of a Faraday bag has negative
ramifications. Once a Faraday container
isolates a cell phone from radio frequency, the
device’s battery life will be significantly
shortened as the cell phone raises its power
consumption levels in an attempt to connect
to a network that is being blocked by the
Faraday bag. Finally, certain mobile device
manufacturers and cellular service providers
design and implement protocols that cause
cell phones to reset or clear data if isolated
from the network for an extended period of
time (Ayers, Brothers, and Jansen, 2013, p.
30).
The final options presented by the
Supreme Court allow first responders to
disable the automatic-lock feature on a phone
to prevent data encryption and protection
through passcodes, or to put the device in
airplane mode to disallow cellular and wireless
network connectivity (Ayers, Brothers, and
Jansen, 2013, p. 15). Although both of these
methods have the potential to preserve the
integrity of the digital evidence, they present
a shared concern for law enforcement
personnel. Disabling automatic-lock features
and enabling airplane mode both require the
direct manipulation of the device, as the first
responder directly interacts with the cell
phone. These methods technically necessitate
a directly intrusive altering of the device’s
data, resulting in a digital footprint, which
© 2014 ADFSL
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could prove problematic if the first responder
is unfamiliar with the cell phone or the
methodologies
being
used.
The
law
enforcement community can mitigate these
concerns by providing base levels of training,
as well as ensuring that first responders who
are tasked with disabling an automatic-lock
feature or enabling airplane mode understand
that they must document the actions taken in
order to preserve the integrity of the evidence.
While none of the techniques provided by the
Supreme Court represent airtight solutions to
the Government’s concerns regarding data
vulnerability, they should succeed in
establishing a crucial foundation for awareness
throughout the law enforcement community
regarding the quality and nature of
evidentiary data within cell phones.

6.

THE SUPREME COURT
AND TECHNOLOGY

The Supreme Court in Riley acknowledged
the prevalence of modern cell phones in
American society, noting, “the proverbial
visitor from Mars might conclude they were
an important feature of human anatomy”
(Riley v. California, 2014, p. 2484). Yet, the
justices themselves seem to lack this
familiarity with cell phones and other
technology. The average age of the nine
justices sitting on the Supreme Court today is
68 years old. As law and technology continue
to intertwine, the lack of technical awareness
of the Supreme Court justices is increasingly
apparent. Justice Elena Kagan, the Supreme
Court’s youngest justice at age 54, even
identified the issue of age and technology. In
regards to cell phones, she stated, “[t]hey're
computers. They have as much computing
capacity as laptops did five years ago. And
everybody under a certain age, let’s say under
40, has everything on them” (Serwer, 2014).
The justices do not even use email to
communicate with one another (Smith,
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2013).3 They received substantial criticism
for their comments during the oral arguments
for American Broadcasting Cos. v. Aereo,
Inc. (2014), a recent case regarding the
retransmission for cable television over the
Internet.
Several justices were unable to
understand how the technology at issue
actually
worked,
with
Justice
Sonia
Sotomayor admitting, “this is really hard for
me” (American Broadcasting Cos. v. Aereo,
Inc., oral arguments, 2014; Rubin, 2014).
Justice Stephen Breyer was similarly
befuddled, proclaiming to counsel during oral
argument that “what disturbs me on the other
side is I don’t understand what the decision
for you and against you when I write it is
going to do to all kinds of other technologies.
I’ve read the briefs fairly carefully, and I’m
still uncertain that I understand it”
(American Broadcasting Cos. v. Aereo, Inc.,
oral arguments, 2014; Rubin, 2014). The
technological confusion was also apparent in a
2010 case regarding the use of pagers by
employees.
In City of Ontario v. Quon,
Justice Anthony Kennedy displayed his
misunderstanding of texting.
During oral
argument, he inquired about what would
happen if an individual both sends and
receives a text message at the same time,
“Does it say: ‘Your call is important to us,
and we will get back to you’” (City of Ontario
v. Quon, oral argument, 2010)? In the same
case, Chief Justice Roberts had to ask counsel
to explain the difference between a pager and
e-mail.4
The justices not only need to understand
how technology works, but also how the
average American utilizes technology in their
daily lives. During the oral argument for
Riley, Chief Justice Roberts was surprised to
3

Justice Elena Kagan announced that the justices
do not use email as a means of communication
during a speech at Brown University in August
2013.
4
Chief Justice Roberts asked, “Maybe -- maybe
everybody else knows this, but what is the
difference between the pager and the e-mail?”
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hear that individuals sometimes carry more
than one cell phone. He specifically asked
defense lawyer Judith Mizner in relation to
Brima Wurie, “[w]hy would he have two cell
phones?” When Ms. Mizner replied that it
was a common occurrence, Chief Justice
Roberts replied,"[w]hat is your authority for
the statement that many people have multiple
cell phones on their person" (Riley v.
California, oral argument, 2014; Hurley,
2014)? The exchange during oral argument
seemed to suggest that Roberts believed only
a drug dealer involved in illegal activity would
possess two cell phones. While the confusion
did not appear to impact the ultimate
decision in Riley, it raises concerns about
future cases with continually advancing
technology.
The degree to which Supreme Court
justices truly need to understand technology
before they issue a legal ruling is debatable.
The Court continually confronts factually
complex issues on a variety of subject. Patent
cases, for example, are notoriously intricate
and can involve any number of scientific or
engineering disciplines. A justice does not
need to be an expert in every field that is
brought before the Supreme Court. However,
they should seek outside assistance when
addressing an advancing field to avoid the
appearance of looking foolish and out-of-date.
Perhaps the greatest threat to the Supreme
Court in technologically related cases is the
complete loss of public confidence.
A
controversial
verdict
is
undoubtedly
questioned when the leading Court in the
country doesn’t know the correct name for the
widely popular Netflix or that HBO is not a
free television channel (Logiurato, 2014).5
While their understanding of technology is
relatively limited, the justices appear to
appreciate the impact digital devices
potentially have on a citizen’s expectation of
privacy. In 2012, the Supreme Court
5

Justice Sotomayor referred to Netflix
“Netflick” in the Aereo oral argument.

as
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addressed the issue of monitoring a suspect
through the use of modern global positioning
systems or GPS. In United States v. Jones, a
physical monitor was placed on a suspect’s
automobile without a valid warrant and his
position was tracked for four weeks. The
majority concluded that a search occurred due
in part to the physical intrusion on Jones’
automobile. GPS monitoring today, however,
does not always require the attachment of a
physical object, but can be accomplished
remotely through a suspect’s cell phone or
other electronic device. In her concurrence,
Justice Sotomayor recognized the challenges
advancing technology poses to privacy interest
protected by the Fourth Amendment. She
specifically noted that “[a]wareness that the
Government may be
watching chills
associational and expressive freedoms” (U.S.
v. Jones, 2012, p. 956). Justice Sotomayor
also suggests that the new digital age might
require a reconsideration of the expectation of
privacy for information voluntarily disclosed.
Citizens typically disclose large amounts of
personal information in order to complete
routine tasks on their electronic devices, such
as purchasing items online. In modern times,
Justice Sotomayor explains that “secrecy” is
not always a “prerequisite for privacy” (U.S.
v. Jones, p. 957). Consequently, the entire
foundation of the expectation of privacy in
digital information is potentially up for
reconsideration in future cases before the
Supreme Court.

7.

CONCLUSION

A Supreme Court decision’s full impact
cannot be measured until the lower courts
begin to interpret and apply the ruling. For
example, a broad reading of Riley v.
California may result in the imposition of a
warrant requirement in situations beyond
searches incident to arrest. Alternatively, the
courts may view the exigency exception as a
broad loophole for law enforcement to review
preliminary cell phone data that is connected
to an ongoing crime or the imminent
destruction of evidence. Riley, however, is
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not the last word on searching digital
information on cell phones and other devices.
The justices left many areas open for
interpretation and future Supreme Court
decisions. Specifically, Riley’s application to
other electronic devices remains uncertain.
Similarly, Riley deliberately fails to address
cell phone searches in the context of other
warrantless searches such as plain view or the
automobile exception.
For now, law
enforcement must work within the confines of
Riley and obtain warrants in most search
incident to arrest situations.
The small
blueprint of acceptable techniques provided
by the Supreme Court should be carefully
followed as the legal wrangling continues.
While seemingly straightforward, the Riley
decision has provided the platform from which
contentious debate will undoubtedly rise, as
the intersection of technology and criminal
procedure continues to impact the law
enforcement community.
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